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JURISDICTIONAL, PROCEDURAL, AND ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS FOR NON-PARTY ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
ABSTRACT
Despite the 2006 amendments targeted to accommodate electronic
discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize the unique
differences between electronic discovery and the discovery of traditional
media. One particularly troubling area is the discovery of electronically
stored information that is proprietary to a non-party. The Federal Rules
provide only for the production of electronically stored information in the
“possession, custody, or control” of both parties and non-parties. This
Comment explores the application of this standard to electronic networks
existing between a party and a non-party. It questions the expansive scope of
discovery of data retrievable from such networks and recommends an
alternative to protect the interests of non-parties in the discovery process.
Existing case law, developed for the discovery of traditional media,
broadly defines the “possession, custody, or control” of discoverable
information as that which a party or non-party has the “ability to access.”
The effects of this interpretation are inconsequential for the discovery of
traditional media—for example, a written memo located in the desk of an
employee. With electronic discovery, however, a broad scope of discovery
may deprive a non-party of an opportunity to contest the production of its
proprietary information by a party in litigation when that non-party would
otherwise have no involvement. From a party’s perspective, a broad discovery
standard also complicates the ability to preserve electronically stored
information at the onset of litigation.
This Comment proposes that the ability-to-access test should not be applied
to the discovery of electronically stored information. A party should instead
only be obligated to produce data from a non-party that are directly related to
a transaction or occurrence in litigation. Any broader discovery should
instead be obtained through a subpoena served on a non-party.
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INTRODUCTION
A plaintiff sues a defendant over an intellectual property dispute, alleging
that products marketed and sold by the defendant infringe several patents held
by the plaintiff. To determine the extent, if any, of the defendant’s
infringement, the plaintiff needs discovery of the defendant’s materials relating
to the design and development of the defendant’s products. The defendant did
not create the allegedly infringing products on its own, however. It
collaborated on the product’s design and development with a non-party
corporation affiliated with the defendant but which the plaintiff chose not to
name as a defendant.1 To facilitate more efficient communication and sharing
of data about this and other products, the defendant and the non-party had
created a computer network.2 The plaintiff now seeks information from that
computer network, including data that are proprietary to the non-party.3
Burdened by the broad scope of discovery and having minimal interest in
opposing the plaintiff’s discovery request on behalf of the non-party, the
defendant retrieves the non-party’s data from the network and produces it to
the requesting party without consulting the non-party or seeking a protective
order.
Electronically stored information (ESI) is now a fundamental fixture of
commercial litigation, and courts face the task of adapting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) to this unique method of discovery.4 In
response, the Rules Advisory Committee acknowledged in adopting the 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules that electronic data involve necessary

1 Some possible reasons why a plaintiff in this hypothetical situation might not name the non-party as a
defendant might include the following: the plaintiff saw a strategic advantage in excluding the non-party from
the litigation, the plaintiff could not state a viable legal claim against the non-party, or the plaintiff could not
secure personal jurisdiction over the non-party.
2 For an arrangement of parties in a case similar to the one hypothesized in this Comment, see Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. C-08-80211 MISC. JF (PVT), 2009 WL 102808 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2009).
Here, Viacom sued YouTube seeking relief for the posting of Viacom’s copyrighted material online. Id. at *1.
Viacom contracted with BayTSP, a third party, to use its crawler software to find unauthorized Viacom clips
posted on YouTube. Id. at *2. During discovery, YouTube sought electronic discovery from BayTSP and
requested a third-party subpoena to obtain it. Id. This Comment explores the legal implications of Viacom
hypothetically having access to BayTSP’s computer network and being able to retrieve and produce the
requested discovery on its own.
3 For the purposes of this Comment, whether the proprietary information is owned by the non-party is
irrelevant. What is important is that the non-party is not involved in the litigation at the time its proprietary
data, materials, or information is produced. This Comment uses discoverable “data,” “materials,” and
“information” interchangeably.
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
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differences from traditional discovery.5 Yet despite being tailored specifically
to electronic discovery, these amendments only changed existing laws that
addressed discovery of traditional media.6 As with most changes to
procedure,7 this approach ignores the full extent to which new technology
impacts existing legal frameworks.8
Electronic networks now provide the predominant forum for interaction
between people, businesses, or both.9 These interactions inevitably result in
litigation that involves electronic discovery of information held by nonparties.10 Unfortunately, the Federal Rules remain ill-suited for the discovery
of this uniquely situated ESI.11 Consequently, courts and the Rules Advisory
Committee should reexamine the approach taken toward electronic discovery
involving non-parties. This Comment argues that courts should be limited in
their ability to compel a party to disclose a non-party’s proprietary information
to which the party has electronic access. In such cases, a party should only be
obligated to disclose the ESI that is directly related to a transaction or
occurrence implicated in the litigation.12 For discovery of any additional ESI
from that non-party, a requesting party should have to subpoena the nonparty.13
Accommodating the unique nature of ESI through this approach is
analogous to the change that personal jurisdiction doctrine underwent during
the Industrial Revolution.14 Advances in transportation created a more mobile
society, so courts went beyond the traditional limits of territoriality to establish

5

See id. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
One of the central arguments of this Comment is that under Rule 34 and Rule 45, determining a party’s
“possession, custody, or control” of ESI is problematic, if not impossible. See infra Part I.D.
7 See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond Efficiency: The Transformation of Courts Through Technology, 12
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2008).
8 See infra Part II.
9 Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2180–81
(2009); see also Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 3, 4 (“Between 1990 and 2005 more
than 1 billion people worldwide entered the middle class. As they get richer they become more literate, which
fuels information growth . . . . The results are showing up in politics, economics and the law . . . .”).
10 See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 26 (2006); see also Data, Data Everywhere, supra
note 9, at 5 (“The data-centered economy is just nascent . . . . You can see the outlines of it, but the technical,
infrastructural and even business-model implications are not well understood right now.” (quoting Craig
Mundie, head of research and strategy at Microsoft) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
13 See infra Parts II.B, III.B–III.C.
14 See infra Part III.A.
6
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jurisdiction15 and began to examine a defendant’s contacts with a forum to
determine personal jurisdiction.16 This Comment’s approach similarly relies
on the contacts between a party and a non-party to justify a party’s discovery
obligations.17
Part I of this Comment examines the current state of electronic discovery
under the Federal Rules and explores concerns of cost and data preservation
unique to electronic discovery. Part II explores the dilemma that arises in
complex litigation where non-parties become implicated in discovery. Part III
analyzes the effects of this Comment’s proposed approach on jurisdictional,
procedural, and economic considerations for electronic discovery.
I. PROCEDURE IN A DIGITAL AGE
Electronic discovery amplifies problems that seem minor or irrelevant in
the discovery of traditional media.18 To understand these issues, a synopsis of
the current state of the Federal Rules and the issues arising in their application
to electronic discovery is necessary.19 Section A provides a summary of the
Federal Rules as they relate to electronic discovery. Section B discusses cost
concerns presented by electronic discovery. Section C discusses the
preservation of electronic data. Finally, section D applies the Federal Rules in
their current form to non-party discovery.

15 See Scott D. Irwin, Note, Burnham v. Superior Court of California: The Final Word on Transient
Personal Jurisdiction?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 613, 618–19 (1992).
16 See id.
17 See infra Part III.A.
18 See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 566 (2001)
(concluding that electronic discovery deserves treatment different from traditional forms of discovery because
it “more often or more severely” gives rise to problems encountered in traditional discovery).
19 This Comment evaluates the implications of non-party electronic discovery from the perspective of the
Federal Rules. For discovery from an international entity, the procedure established by the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters may also be used. See Erica M. Davila,
International E-Discovery: Navigating the Maze, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 5, 17 (2008). In practice,
however, the difficult application of the Hague Convention combined with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), has led to the
abandonment of its use in American litigation. See Davila, supra at 17. The difficulty in using the Hague
Convention for discovery explains parties’ use of Rule 34 for document production from a related, but nonparty, foreign entity. See id. To further complicate matters, many foreign countries have enacted privacy
laws, blocking statutes, and secrecy laws to prevent the international transmission of electronic data in
American litigation. See id. at 6–15. While certainly important, these international issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
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A. The Federal Rules and Electronic Discovery
Despite the 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules, which purported to
lessen the burden of discovery on parties,20 the scope of discovery still remains
quite broad, as the materials sought need only be nonprivileged and relevant to
a claim or defense.21 Even if discoverable information is not admissible at
trial, production to a requesting party is still required if it is “reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”22 As a result,
parties to litigation face potentially enormous discovery obligations.23
Production of ESI often results in the production of millions of pages of
documents at considerable expense,24 all occurring with minimal court
involvement.25
The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules attempted to tailor the existing
rules to the needs of electronic discovery.26 In so doing, they added
“electronically stored information” to the list of discoverable items under
Rules 34 and 45.27 Rule 34 thereby allows a requesting party to compel
another party to produce relevant ESI within its “possession, custody, or
control.”28 Likewise, Rule 45 allows a requesting party to secure a subpoena
to compel a non-party to produce ESI within its “possession, custody, or
control.”29
The 2006 amendments also encourage greater contact between parties to
litigation to anticipate and resolve discovery disputes without resorting to

20 Arguably, the wording changes made by the 2000 amendments have no effect on the scope of
discoverable evidence. See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 62–63 (2007). Regardless of the intended effect of the 2000 amendments, the “good
cause” standard creating two tiers of discoverable information has no practical effect on curbing large
production obligations. See id.
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
22 Id.
23 See Noyes, supra note 20, at 62–63.
24 Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs of
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2007).
25 Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of
Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 384–85 (2008).
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments; id. 45 advisory committee’s
note to 2006 amendments.
27 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments; id. 45 advisory committee’s
note to 2006 amendments.
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
29 Id. 45(a)(1)(C).
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procedural formalities.30 Many judges, in contrast, regard discovery as a
process solely between parties and choose to avoid becoming involved unless
an irresolvable dispute arises.31 Parties therefore feel obligated to arrange for
the production of ESI among themselves without court intervention.32
Consistent with this attitude, Rule 26 requires that parties meet and confer
early in litigation to devise a plan to conduct the discovery process as
efficiently as possible.33
B. Cost Considerations Under the Federal Rules
The 2006 amendments created a two-tiered approach to discoverable
information.34 A party may not be obligated to produce ESI if that discovery is
not “reasonably accessible” and production would cause the party “undue
burden or cost.”35 Upon such a showing, a court may still order that party to
produce discovery but only upon a showing of “good cause” by the requesting
party.36 This provision creates a de facto two-tiered approach which limits
discovery based on proportionality—weighing the potential benefits of the
discoverable ESI against the burden its production is likely to impose.37 Some

30 See id. 26(f) (requiring that parties meet and confer before the scheduling conference to resolve
logistical problems for electronic discovery).
31 Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday Ethics of Defense
Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 765 (1998); see also, e.g., Mirbeau of Geneva Lake LLC v. City of Lake
Geneva, No. 08-CV-693, 2009 WL 3347101, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2009) (“[T]he parties need to genuinely
communicate with each other, as discovery is supposed to be self executing. The Court cannot be expected to
be cast in the role of babysitter at the slightest discovery problem.”). The 2006 amendments recognized the
need for court involvement in electronic discovery, but courts remain hesitant to involve themselves fully in
the process. Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 25, at 384–85.
32 Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 25, at 384.
33 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
34 See id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
35 Id. 26(b)(2)(B).
36 Id.
37 Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9
(2007) (remarks of Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal). The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 26 identifies seven
factors for consideration under the proportionality test:

(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information available from other
and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems
likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the
likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more
easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further
information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’
resources.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
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courts use cost shifting as a method to ease the burden of electronic discovery
on parties and non-parties alike.38
C. Preservation Obligations Under the Federal Rules
Even before the onset of formal litigation, parties may be required to
preserve any physical documents or electronic data that may be subject to
discovery during the litigation.39 Any electronic data in a party’s “possession,
custody, or control” may be subject to production in litigation.40 As an
exception, courts cannot impose sanctions under Rule 37 for the loss of
electronic data that occurs because of the “routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.”41 As this Comment argues, however, this safe
harbor provision does nothing to cure the fundamental defects of Rule 45’s
production standards.42 In addition, the “ephemeral” nature of electronic data
makes such standards governing a party’s duty to preserve ESI difficult to
apply.43
Sanctions may be imposed after a requesting party has secured a court
order to compel discovery and the opposing party fails to comply.44 Possible
sanctions include: directing that matters or facts must be established as claimed
by the non-sanctioned party, prohibiting the sanctioned party from supporting
or opposing designated claims or defenses, striking pleadings, staying
proceedings, dismissing the action or proceeding, rendering default judgment
38

Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 125

(2004).
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments (“A preservation obligation
may arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the case.”); see,
e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., No. 05 Civ. 9016(SAS), 2010
WL 184312, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (recognizing a common law duty to preserve relevant evidence
upon reasonable anticipation of litigation). The problem identified by this Comment occurs regardless of the
time at which a duty to preserve discoverable information becomes effective. See infra Part II.B.
40 See, e.g., In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-00086-SBA, 2008 WL 1831668, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 22, 2008).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
42 See infra Part II.B.
43 See Rae N. Cougar, Managing Information: Meeting the Requirements of Electronic Production, 45
IDAHO L. REV. 377, 379–82 (2009) (“Electronic records are different than paper records. . . . Effective
management of information requires understanding of its relevant business uses, legal retention requirements,
types of information systems, and the limitations of those systems. . . . In order to effectively manage
information, an organization must identify all the systems that create, receive, store, and retain the information,
plus any information that is retained on old media—created by systems no longer in use. . . . As new
technologies are created, information owners must determine their best use for the overall management of
corporate informational assets.” (footnotes omitted)).
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b).
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against the sanctioned party, finding the sanctioned party in contempt of court,
or requiring payment of expenses by the sanctioned party.45 In addition to
citing the Federal Rules for the authority to impose sanctions, courts also
justify sanctions as being part of their “inherent power to oversee litigation.”46
D. The Federal Rules and Electronic Discovery Involving Non-Parties
To compel a non-party located in the United States to produce discovery, a
party must obtain a subpoena from a district court where production from the
non-party is to be made—not from the district court where the case is being
litigated—and serve it in accordance with the Federal Rules.47 Difficulties
arise, however, from lacking or inconsistent precedent.48 Precedent guiding
the resolution of discovery disputes in a particular jurisdiction is often limited
or even nonexistent.49 Judges enjoy a wide degree of discretion in determining
whether to grant a motion to compel discovery.50 This discretion, combined
with the interlocutory nature of discovery rulings, rarely provides litigants with
an incentive to appeal what they consider an adverse decision.51 As a practical
matter, cases often settle in an effort to avoid the substantial cost involved in
discovery, further preventing discovery decisions from being challenged.52
Thus, the shortage of case law for discovery allows district courts the freedom
to stretch the extent of a party or non-party’s possession, custody, or control of
ESI necessary to compel production.

45

Id. 37(b)(2).
Quintus Corp. v. Avaya, Inc. (In re Quintus Corp.), 353 B.R. 77, 92 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(2)(C).
48 Barbara A. Caulfield & Zuzana Svihra, Electronic Discovery Issues for 2002: Requiring the Losing
Party to Pay for the Costs of Digital Discovery, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 181 (2001) (“Due to the absence of a
coherent body of law, courts seem to decide digital discovery disputes based on an amalgamation of their own
armchair knowledge of technology and precedent from traditional forms of discovery disputes. While this
precedent does provide some degree of guidance, the issues that arise concerning electronic discovery result in
unique problems that never surfaced in traditional discovery settings.”).
49 Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up
to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 351 (2000). This problem with precedent can largely be attributed to a
“publication bias” in which few published decisions regarding discovery exist and unpublished decisions
contain fewer details and weaker reasoning. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but
Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 949–50
(2009). Published cases that are followed are often federal district court cases, so the extent of their authority
also is not uniform. See id. at 901–02 (providing, as an example, the limited adherence to Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
50 See 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2215 (3d ed. 1999).
51 See Caulfield & Svihra, supra note 48, at 182; Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 49, at 351.
52 See Caulfield & Svihra, supra note 48, at 181 (discussing the shortage of precedent for discovery
disputes and the frequency with which parties settle to avoid discovery costs).
46
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When courts do resolve electronic discovery disputes, they tend to adapt
existing case law out of convenience.53 Under the Federal Rules, a party
seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing an opposing party or nonparty’s possession, custody, or control of the requested materials.54 Courts
look for a substantive legal relationship between a party and non-party in light
of the subject matter of what is sought, or they assess a party’s practical ability
to access the requested materials in the same context.55
In line with the American model of discovery, courts have expanded the
“legal right” test to include a “practical ability” or ability-to-access approach to
determine “possession, custody, or control.”56 Under the ability-to-access test,
courts look not to whether a party has a legal right to discovery of information
proprietary to a non-party but to whether a party has the practical ability to
access that information.57 In essence, courts disregard any legal relationship
between a party and non-party and instead focus on the possibility of
producing discoverable information.58 If a party has access to the non-party’s
discoverable information—regardless of a specified legal right to obtain and

53 Because of the “extrajudicial” nature of discovery, this Comment relies on the use of unreported case
law to conduct an adequate “field survey” of court decisions in this area. See Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 489 (1970).
54 Camden Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D.N.J. 1991).
55 Courts often narrow the scope of “possession, custody, or control” to documents that are highly
relevant to the subject matter of the litigation. See, e.g., Cohen v. Horowitz, No. 07 Civ. 5834(PKC), 2008
WL 2332338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008). While ordinarily any relevant materials are required to be
produced, in this context courts may narrow the degree of relevance to the transaction at issue in the litigation.
See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 253–56 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (determining a subsidiary
party’s control of discoverable information possessed by its parent by examining the use of the requested
information in the ordinary course of business between the two entities and the extent to which the subsidiary
marketed the product at issue); In re Rubber Chem. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1083 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (finding that a party’s access to discovery was “not dispositive” because the documents bore no relation
to the subject matter of the litigation); Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp., 113 F.R.D. 127, 131 (D. Del.
1986) (“[A] non-party’s participation in a transaction, and its consequent possession of related documents,
must be considered in determining control for Rule 34 purposes.”).
56 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., v. Midland Bancor, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 562, 566 (D. Kan. 1994)
(“The ability to obtain documents on demand ‘is not affected by the source’s retention of ownership or its
unilaterally imposed restriction on disclosure.’” (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 145
F.R.D. 108, 110 (D. Colo. 1992))).
57 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
58 See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Under Rule 34, ‘control’
does not require that the party have legal ownership or actual physical possession of the documents at issue;
rather, documents are considered to be under a party’s control when that party has the right, authority, or
practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action.” (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien
BIAO Bank Tanz. Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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produce that information—courts will compel discovery under this model.59
For discovery of traditional media, this framework for determining an
obligation to produce discovery has largely gone unnoticed and likely has not
been criticized because it is in line with the American model of discovery.60
The narrower approach taken for evaluating a party’s possession, custody,
or control examines a party’s “legal right, authority, or ability” to obtain
documents from a non-party.61 While many courts base their analysis on little
more than a general assertion that a party has a legal right to discovery from a
non-party, others isolate specific conditions of substantive law that facilitate
the party’s right to the discovery sought. The existence of a statute,62
contractual relationship,63 or agency relationship64 might establish a party’s

59 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 102 F.R.D. at 920; Autery v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 05-0982, 2010
WL 1489968, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2010) (“Rule 34 is broadly construed and documents within a party’s
control are subject to discovery, even if owned by a nonparty. Thus federal courts have consistently held that
documents are deemed to be within the ‘possession, custody, or control’ of a party . . . if the party has actual
possession, custody, or control, or has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand or has the practical
ability to obtain the documents from a nonparty to the action. . . . [A]t a minimum, [the defendant] has the
practical ability to obtain the documents from [an] outside source.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted)).
60 See Japan Halon Co. v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 155 F.R.D. 626, 629 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (“[I]t is
unlikely that the legal system in the United States . . . is likely to change in any significant way in the
immediate future . . . . The direction of the law is clear and the rule is for expansive discovery. . . .”).
61 In re: Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that all circuit courts to
have addressed the issue have adopted the “legal control” test and rejecting the plaintiff’s suggestion that the
“practical-ability-to-obtain-documents test” be used).
62 See, e.g., Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 2007) (finding that the defendant
was in possession of pension and welfare records because it was required under ERISA regulations to maintain
those records).
63 See, e.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (finding that the defendant
had control over cell phone text messages through a contractual relationship with a cell phone service
provider).
64 In disputes involving business entities, a party may take the position that it has no possession, custody,
or control of documents because those documents are held by a related non-party corporate entity—a parent,
subsidiary, sister corporation, or affiliate, for example. In this situation, courts must determine whether the
relationship between the party and non-party is such that it should disregard the formal corporate distinctions
between the two for purposes of discovery. To do so, courts adapt existing law concerning corporate liability
to find the extent of a party’s possession, custody, or control of the documents at issue. See, e.g., Addamax
Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 462, 467 (D. Mass. 1993). Courts generally draw upon three
areas to justify disregarding corporate formalities. First, courts compel parties to produce documents or ESI if
management overlaps between the party and non-party entities to a significant degree. See Camden Iron and
Metal, Inc. v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438, 443–44 (D.N.J. 1991). Second, parties are obligated to
produce discovery from a related corporate non-party if the non-party exercises what, in the court’s view, is
sufficient control over the party. Id. Finally, courts examine the contact between the party and non-party,
especially with regard to the underlying transaction at issue. Id. Equitable considerations may also find their
way into agency analyses largely in cases where a court’s formal examination of party and non-party entities,
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constructive “possession, custody, or control” over a non-party’s discovery
sufficient for a court to compel production. Regardless of the specific
justification, courts base decisions about the ultimate production of discovery
on the legal relationship between the information sought and the party from
which discovery is requested.65
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NON-PARTY ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
Before the movement to amend the Federal Rules in 2006, both scholars
and practitioners predicted disputes over adapting existing procedural doctrine
to evolving technology.66 Even with the 2006 amendments, non-party
electronic discovery rules are still in need of revision. This Part examines the
implications of the broad discovery obligations under the ability-to-access
standard as it relates to parties having access to non-party ESI. It isolates two
areas—jurisdiction and procedure—needing consideration.
Section A
discusses the jurisdictional impact of excluding a non-party from litigation in
which that non-party’s proprietary ESI is produced by a party that is able to
access the data. Section B then examines the procedural impact of requiring a
party to preserve, at the onset of litigation, non-party data which that party may
later be required to produce in discovery.
A. Jurisdictional Implications
Under the Federal Rules, with limited exceptions, courts are not expected
to treat the discovery of traditional media any differently from discovery of
ESI.67 The 2006 amendments addressed the inclusion of ESI as a distinct
entity of discoverable information, yet the Rules Committee’s declaration that
ESI stands on “equal footing with . . . paper documents”68 has led courts to
treat both media in the same manner.69 The ability-to-access test thus finds its
way into the resolution of disputes involving electronic discovery of nonparties.70
standing alone, is insufficient in its view to justify production. See, e.g., Goh v. Baldor Elec. Co., No. 3:98MC-064-T, 1999 WL 20943, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan 13, 1999).
65 See, e.g., In re: Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d at 1107–08.
66 Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 49, at 341.
67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Ferron v. Search Cactus, LLC, No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr.
28, 2008).
70 See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that a party
had the “practical ability” to obtain relevant documents from a corporate affiliate).
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Under this standard, non-parties are deprived of the right to be served with
a subpoena to compel them to produce discovery. Take, for example, Sedona
Corp. v. Open Solutions, Inc.71 In this case, the plaintiff, Sedona, claimed that
the defendant, Open Solutions, had breached a software licensing agreement.72
To build its case, Sedona requested discovery relating to the development of
the software at issue.73 Open Solutions responded that much of the
development had been completed by a non-party, R Systems, with which Open
Solutions had contracted.74 As a result, Open Solutions contended that it did
not have possession, custody, or control of much of the discovery sought by
the plaintiff.75 In ruling on the dispute, the court ignored any interest
maintained by R Systems and ordered that Open Solutions produce the
requested discovery itself to the extent that it could access R Systems’s data.76
R Systems might have challenged the production of that data, or at the very
least requested a protective order, but it never had a chance to do so.77
Although courts have not addressed the issue in the specific context of
commercial litigation, the right to be served with and subsequently challenge a
subpoena has been declared a fundamental tenet of due process in other
contexts.78 Further, the proper exercise of jurisdiction over a non-party with
regard to discovery is also a requirement for due process.79 A non-party in a
civil proceeding should therefore enjoy the same right to receive and challenge
a subpoena requiring discovery of its electronic data as a non-party in any
other type of proceeding. After all, the Fifth Amendment protects against
deprivation of property without adequate due process.80 At the very least, a
non-party should be able to confirm that it has no objection to the production
of its electronic data.81 At most, a non-party should be able to object to the
71

249 F.R.D. 19 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id. at 21.
73 Id. at 21–24.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 21.
76 Id. at 22.
77 See id. at 24–25.
78 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (“The judicial subpoena power not
only is subject to specific constitutional limitations . . . such as . . . due process of law, but also is subject to
those limitations inherent in the body that issues them because of the provisions of the Judiciary Article of the
Constitution.”).
79 Id.
80 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (“A subpoena . . . commences an
adversary process during which the person served with the subpoena may challenge it in court before
complying with its demands.”).
72
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potential disclosure of trade secrets or other proprietary information or seek to
have a protective order entered on its behalf.82
More generally, procedural due process protections have been applied to
civil procedure. Mathews v. Eldridge marked the Supreme Court’s articulation
of three considerations determinative of whether administrative procedures
adequately provide for due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.83
The Court then extended the application of these considerations to judicial
procedure in Connecticut v. Doehr.84
Application of these factors to non-party electronic discovery is therefore a
natural extension of this precedent.85 Under the ability-to-access test, a nonparty risks its proprietary data being produced in litigation without first
receiving notice and the opportunity to object or request a protective order.
Without the non-party’s involvement, no guarantee exists that the non-party’s
interests will be protected during discovery. Although in many cases the
interests of the non-party and the party that produces the non-party’s ESI may
be aligned, the producing party does not necessarily have an incentive to
protect the non-party’s interests. As a consequence, the first two Mathews
factors provide courts with a foundation for protecting the due process rights of
non-parties whose proprietary data are subject to discovery.
Finally, consider the Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Shcherbakovskiy v.
Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd. overturning a district court’s sanctions against a
plaintiff claiming to be unable to access the documents of a related foreign
non-party entity.86 Here, the usual discussion about a party’s possession,
82

See id.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
84 501 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1991).
85 Recent commentary has argued that the Supreme Court’s decision involving heightened pleading
standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), functionally applies the Mathews factors to
discovery. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to
Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 17–22 (2010).
86 490 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
83
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custody, or control of discovery for purposes of production included the “fairly
obvious” assertion that “a party [from which documents are
requested] . . . need not seek . . . documents from third parties if compulsory
process against the third parties is available to the party seeking the
documents.”87 In cases where a party seeking discovery is able to compel a
non-party to produce discovery directly, the Second Circuit seems to require a
subpoena instead of allowing discovery through an opposing party.88 Yet there
is no consensus among lower courts as to the application of this statement.
One court has followed the Second Circuit and required a party seeking
discovery to compel a non-party directly.89 Another recognized the rationale
for compelling a non-party to produce the requested information, yet still
ordered the party to produce the information within its practical control.90 And
a third court has labeled this aspect of the opinion as dicta.91 Regardless of
these divergent views, the proposition underlying the Second Circuit’s
pronouncement serves as an important reminder of the jurisdictional analysis
inherent in discovery.92
B. Procedural Implications
The deficiencies of the ability-to-access test are further revealed through an
examination of a party’s duty to preserve ESI. Electronic discovery has
presented new challenges to courts in determining the extent to which a party
should be obligated to preserve discoverable data upon anticipation of
87

Id. at 138 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 530 (S.D.N.Y.

1996)).
88 See id. at 138–39. The court indicated that, should a party have the “practical ability” to access
discovery, that party might be compelled to produce discovery if a requesting party could not access that
discovery through the use of a subpoena or otherwise. See id. at 138 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers,
169 F.R.D. at 530).
89 See M’Baye v. N.J. Sports Prod., Inc., Nos. 06 Civ. 3439(DC), 05 Civ. 9581(DC), 2008 WL 1849777,
at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2008).
90 See Cohen v. Horowitz, No. 07 Civ. 5834(PKC), 2008 WL 2332338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008).
91 See In re Lozano, 392 B.R. 48, 57–58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). Because Shcherbakovskiy was an
appellate decision determining the legitimacy of the district court’s sanctions against the plaintiff, the Lozano
court found that the analysis in the Shcherbakovskiy opinion pertaining to non-party discovery was not
necessary to the holding of the case. Id. at 57–58.
92 Outside the Second Circuit, at least one district court has noted this proposition yet declined to follow
it in much the same fashion as the court in Tomlinson. In Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, No. C07-04330 RMW
(HRL), 2008 WL 4786621, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2008), the court noted the need for a subpoena to obtain
discovery from a non-party internet service provider (ISP) because a party to the litigation did not have
“exclusive control” over the discovery sought. Nevertheless, the court compromised this declaration by
ordering the party to obtain the materials at issue from the ISP for subsequent production to the requesting
party. Id. at *3.
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litigation.93 By and large, courts resolve this dilemma by correlating what a
party must preserve with what it ultimately might be obligated to produce—
ESI within its possession, custody, or control.94 The logic of this relationship
is that what a party ultimately might have to produce should be what is
preserved when the duty to preserve is triggered.95 However, by allowing
“possession, custody, or control” of discoverable materials to dictate the scope
of a party’s obligation to preserve, courts fail to recognize the limitations
inherent in the broad spectrum of electronic discovery.96
What a party may “access” is not necessarily the same as what a party can
“control.”97 What a party can access but not control, therefore, may be subject
to spoliation between the onset of litigation and the time a discovery request is
made.98 The extension of the ability-to-access test to electronic discovery
thereby removes the consistency between the ESI a party is obligated to
preserve and what that party may ultimately be obligated to produce. With the
continued use of the practical ability test, courts might find themselves in the
undesirable position of applying divergent definitions of “possession, custody,
or control” to determine a party’s duty to preserve data and that party’s duty to
produce data held by a non-party.99 As a practical matter, then, production of
ESI should only be required if a party has the ability to preserve the ESI at the
onset of litigation.
93 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-Discovery
Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2007) (“A number of unique attributes make the execution of
preservation obligations particularly difficult when ESI is involved.”).
94 See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 514 (D. Md. 2009); In re Flash
Memory Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-00086-SBA, 2008 WL 1831668, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008).
95 See In re Flash Memory, 2008 WL 1831668, at *1.
96 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD. (WG1),
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON NON-PARTY PRODUCTION & RULE 45 SUBPOENAS 7 (Alan
Blakely et al. eds., 2008) (finding that a non-party’s preservation obligation typically only begins upon receipt
of a subpoena and that “[t]he duration of a non-party’s duty to preserve is not coextensive with a party’s duty
to preserve”).
97 Moreno v. Autozone, Inc., No. C-05-4432 CRB (EMC), 2008 WL 906510, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1,
2008) (“Control is generally defined as the legal right to obtain the documents on demand and at times has
been construed more broadly to include the practical ability to obtain the documents sought upon demand.”).
98 Perhaps the safe harbor provision of the Federal Rules would protect a party in the event that ESI out
of the party’s immediate control is deleted before it was requested for production. See supra Part I.B. Given
judges’ broad discretion, there is no guarantee that courts would interpret this provision in that manner. See
supra Part I.D.
99 These conflicting interpretations will prove problematic as statutory construction should strive to
maintain consistency. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 937 (1992) (discussing “the importance of reading a new statute against the legal landscape
and . . . recognizing the value of minimal disruption of existing arrangements consistent with the language and
purpose of the new law”).
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III. INTEGRATING NON-PARTIES INTO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
This Comment proposes that requesting parties may only obtain ESI that is
proprietary to a non-party from a party if that ESI is related to a transaction or
occurrence involved in the litigation. A requesting party may only obtain
anything additional—ESI that is discoverable but not directly related to
litigation—through a non-party subpoena. Narrowing the scope of discovery
for non-party data would ensure adequate jurisdiction over a non-party for
purposes of discovery, making certain that discoverable ESI matches what
must be preserved, and reducing the overly burdensome cost of electronic
discovery. Section A explains the jurisdictional benefits of this proposal and
compares them to the development of personal jurisdiction doctrine in
response to technological advances. Section B describes the procedural
continuity that this approach would create for discoverable ESI. Section C
then examines this approach from a cost perspective.
A. Jurisdictional Benefits
Concerns over jurisdiction and due process highlights the need to change
the procedural framework used for non-party electronic discovery. Recent
scholarly analysis examining courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction over
corporate entities based on the contacts between related business entities and
the litigation forum demonstrates the benefits of this proposed approach.100 As
technological change has revolutionized communication and the exchange of
information, it may be helpful to assess the developments in non-party
electronic discovery relative to changes previously undergone in personal
jurisdiction. Such a comparison may better illustrate the jurisdictional
implications of non-party electronic discovery. However, before conducting
such an analysis, it is necessary to determine whether this comparison should
be made in the first place. That is, one should first assess whether a court
serving a subpoena upon a non-party has the same power as a court serving
process upon a defendant.
100 See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1023 (2004) (rejecting the use of veil-piercing to establish personal jurisdiction over a business entity lacking
sufficient contacts to the forum of a litigation); John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert
Personal Jurisdiction over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV.
445 (2004) (analyzing the variables inherent in establishing jurisdiction over corporate affiliates in light of the
Cannon doctrine); Jennifer A. Schwartz, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil of an Alien Parent for
Jurisdictional Purposes: A Proposal for a Standard that Comports with Due Process, 96 CAL. L. REV. 731
(2008) (examining the use of veil-piercing to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent via the
contacts of its domestic subsidiary).
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Properly assessing this comparison reveals much about the approach that
should be taken by courts to non-party electronic discovery. If personal
jurisdiction considerations apply to non-parties served with subpoenas in
litigation in the same manner as they do to a defendant, then a court should
apply those same considerations when compelling a non-party to produce
discoverable information. To be sure, all personal jurisdiction cases examined
by the United States Supreme Court have involved jurisdiction over parties,101
and some of the underlying considerations involved in establishing personal
jurisdiction are less relevant in the context of non-party discovery.102 Further,
personal jurisdiction over a defendant potentially results in a judgment against
the defendant as a party,103 while refusing to comply with a subpoena will, at
worst, result in contempt of court being imposed upon an uncooperative nonparty.104
Notwithstanding these arguments, a subpoena still signifies a court’s power
over a non-party.105 Whether entering a judgment against a defendant or
holding a non-party in contempt, a court is exercising its judicial enforcement

101 Ryan W. Scott, Note, Minimum Contacts, No Dog: Evaluating Personal Jurisdiction for Nonparty
Discovery, 88 MINN. L. REV. 968, 975–77 (2004). One commentary contends that Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), is dispositive with regard to the issue of personal jurisdiction over non-parties
through a subpoena. Scott, supra, at 975–77. However, Phillips Petroleum concerned a court’s jurisdiction
over plaintiffs represented in a class action proceeding which would ultimately have a preclusive effect on any
future claims. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 805. In light of this fact, and the fact that the central issue
in Phillips Petroleum involved jurisdiction over plaintiffs and not a defendant, the case should be distinguished
from those involving non-party subpoenas. See id.
102 Discovery from a non-party is necessarily more limited in scope and time than discovery from a party,
and statutory provisions in the Federal Rules limit the scope and potential cost of discovery to non-parties. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). A non-party may have little stake in the outcome of a case, which further reduces
the burden for which personal jurisdiction limitations are designed to account. Not only does a judgment
against a defendant have an obvious direct effect on that defendant, it also can bar subsequent litigation by a
plaintiff.
103 See id. 54–63.
104 See id. 45(e).
105 The Supreme Court has hinted that a court’s subpoena power should correspond to the extent of its
jurisdiction. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988).
Although the decision in U.S. Catholic Conference rested on the lower court’s subject matter jurisdiction and
not its personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court’s analysis may also apply to personal jurisdiction.
See id. at 77 (“[C]ourts have finite bounds of authority, some of constitutional origin, which exist to protect
citizens from the very wrong asserted here, the excessive use of judicial power.”). Thus, if subpoena power is
allowed up to the extent of a court’s jurisdiction, the territorial restrictions on subpoenas in Rule 45 represent a
statutory—not a constitutional—limitation. But see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138–39 (1992)
(distinguishing U.S. Catholic Conference and finding a distinction between the purpose of a civil contempt
order and sanctions imposed on a party).
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power.106 Further, if a court can establish personal jurisdiction over a
defendant based solely on a defendant’s contacts with a forum, then a court
should be able to subpoena discoverable materials from a non-party based on
the same minimum contacts test without territorial limitation. A court’s
jurisdictional reach with respect to discovery should therefore include all
territory where production of discovery is reasonably certain to take place.107
Many scholarly commentators agree and favor subpoena power based on
personal jurisdiction over a non-party.108 Aligning subpoena power with the
scope of personal jurisdiction helps justify a fundamental change in the rules
for non-party electronic discovery.109
On a basic level, personal jurisdiction involves a court’s power to exercise
its authority over an entity. Perfecting such jurisdiction can be achieved either
through an entity’s presence in, or minimum contacts with, the forum.110 The
Court first addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s
presence in a forum in the seminal case Pennoyer v. Neff.111 There the
Supreme Court set the foundation for a territorial approach to personal
jurisdiction, allowing a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant served
with process when present in the state.112 This presence-based approach
continued until the proliferation of corporations and the increase in interstate
travel made it unworkable.113 Then, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
the Supreme Court went beyond the presence-based approach of Pennoyer and

106 See Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37, 105
(1989) (discussing Whitley v. Lutheran Hosp., 392 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)). Compare Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (“A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation
on one person in favor of another.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006) (“A court of the United States shall have
power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority . . . as
[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”).
107 See Wasserman, supra note 106, at 105. (discussing Whitley, 392 N.E.2d 729).
108 See id. at 91; Scott, supra note 101, at 970.
109 Even if non-party subpoena power was an assertion of judicial authority distinct from personal
jurisdiction, the very nature of a court’s subpoena power would still require some legal restraint under the Due
Process Clause. See supra Part II.A. As a result, if this comparison is not legitimate, the problem identified
and solution proposed by this Comment remain sound.
110 See Irwin, supra note 15, at 621–28 (discussing the changes in personal jurisdiction beginning with the
“minimum contacts” test in Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
111 See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For a discussion of the origins of English
personal jurisdiction law, which American law ultimately adopted, see Wasserman, supra note 106, at 43–51.
112 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court questioned the
sufficiency of presence alone as a basis for personal jurisdiction, but its subsequent plurality decision in
Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990), reaffirmed that presence is sufficient for establishing personal
jurisdiction.
113 Wasserman, supra note 106, at 52–53.
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allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over an entity not present in the forum but
instead with such minimum contacts that “maintenance of [a] suit” would not
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”114 Thus, while
territorial limitations originally provided the basis for personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, a need for greater flexibility caused American law to adopt a
minimum contacts analysis to better accommodate evolving technology and
business conducted across state lines.115
Despite these new tools for exercising personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, subpoenas compelling a non-party to produce discoverable
materials maintain their original territorial limitations.116 As the Federal Rules
currently stand, the ability to compel a non-party to produce discovery hinges
solely on that non-party’s physical presence and bears no relationship to the
contacts it maintains with the litigation forum.117 While courts have not made
accommodations for evolving technology to find jurisdiction over a non-party
for discoverable information,118 they have expanded their characterization of a
party’s possession, custody, or control of discoverable information to
circumvent these territorial limitations.119 Commentary on this subject has
already pointed to the need to reevaluate the territorial limitations of
subpoenas.120
114 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Court expanded upon International Shoe,
identifying five factors for consideration in conjunction with a defendant’s minimum contacts:

[(1)] the burden on the defendant, . . . [(2)] the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute[,] . . . [(3)] the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief[,] . . . [(4)]
the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies[,] . . . and [(5)] the shared interest of the several States in furthering substantive
social policies.
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations omitted). In addition to balancing these interests, courts must consider
whether a defendant could reasonably expect to be haled into court in the forum. Id.
115 Wasserman, supra note 106, at 52–53.
116 These limitations have been criticized as adhering to an “antiquated view of state court power.” Id. at
39. Advances in technology justify an expansion of the scope of subpoenas beyond territorial limits. Id. at 65.
In addition, any subpoena of a non-party must comply with due process. Scott, supra note 101, at 992–93.
117 Wasserman, supra note 106, at 41.
118 Id.; see also Cathaleen A. Roach, It’s Time to Change the Rule Compelling Witness Appearance at
Trial: Proposed Revisions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e), 79 GEO. L.J. 81, 90 (1990) (noting that
“rigid adherence to the letter of the rule” despite advances in technology “can produce absurd results”).
119 Because judges maintain great discretion over discovery disputes, they are able to overcome
limitations on non-party subpoenas by simply compelling an opposing party to produce the discovery. See
supra Part I.A.
120 See generally Wasserman, supra note 106 (rejecting the territorial limitation of subpoenas as
inconsistent with the evolution of personal jurisdiction).
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In the context of electronic discovery, the failure to adapt procedural law to
changes in technology leads courts to apply makeshift remedies, which only
furthers the tension between broad discovery and due process.121 Compelling
document production under both Rule 34 and Rule 45 presupposes the
existence of a court’s power over the entity from which discovery is sought.122
To compel a party to produce discoverable information, a court need not take
any additional action to assert its jurisdiction123—that party has already been
brought under the court’s jurisdiction and must produce anything within its
possession, custody, or control.124 To compel a non-party to produce
documents, however, the court must issue a subpoena to the non-party.125
Service of a subpoena thus perfects a court’s authority over the non-party and
ensures that the obligation to produce discoverable information comports with
due process.126
Where a court does not issue a subpoena and a party produces discovery
based on its ability to access a non-party’s electronic data, the traditional
jurisdictional and due process considerations inherent in a subpoena are not
applied.127 Under the approach this Comment suggests, a party’s ability to
discover information from a non-party should therefore be limited. Similar to
a party’s expectations for being subject to suit in a particular forum, a nonparty should expect that the data it shares with another entity will be
discoverable to the extent that the data are relevant to that litigation. The
requesting party should therefore only be entitled to the discoverable data that
are directly related to the litigation.128
The alternative to securing a subpoena that this Comment proposes—
production by a party of a non-party’s material only when that material is
related to a transaction or occurrence in the litigation—is analogous to the
minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction.129 In such cases, if a nonparty maintained electronic contact with a party that later became involved in
121

See supra Part II.A.
See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
123 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2208 (3d ed. 1999).
124 Id.
125 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c) (citing id. 45).
126 Scott, supra note 101, at 993–97.
127 See supra Part II.A.
128 See, e.g., Mintel Int’l Group, Ltd. v. Neerghen, No. 08 CV 3939, 2009 WL 249227, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 3, 2009). This dependence on the potential relevance of the discoverable materials is consistent with the
Federal Rules’ two-tiered approach to electronic discovery. See supra Part II.B.
129 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1958) (requiring that minimum contacts with a forum
state be related to the transaction or occurrence at issue in litigation).
122
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litigation, the non-party could reasonably expect that its electronic data might
be relevant to a litigation involving the party. Further, this alternative
requirement is in line with the Advisory Committee’s commitment to
narrowing the burdensome scope of discovery as well as the approach courts
sometimes adopt under existing case law.
Although the proposed framework lowers restrictions on jurisdiction over a
non-party, it still limits the scope of discoverable information and therefore is
consistent with the Advisory Committee’s concerns. Only the data that a nonparty could expect to be used in a litigation—those which relate directly to a
transaction or occurrence at issue in the litigation—would be subject to
production. The remainder of this Part will explain the procedural and
economic benefits of this approach.
B. Procedural Benefits
This Comment aims to eliminate the discrepancy that exists under the
ability-to-access test between what a party is obligated to produce and what it
must preserve in reasonable anticipation of litigation. Otherwise, parties may
be held responsible for producing data that were outside of their control when
litigation seemed reasonably likely to occur. Narrowing the scope of discovery
for non-party ESI would limit a party’s exposure to this inconsistency.
The preservation standard for ESI is one of the most contentious issues in
electronic discovery.130 Courts struggle to determine when a party’s failure to
preserve ESI should result in sanctions.131 Courts impose sanctions when they
conclude that a party acted in bad faith or with indifference with respect to its
discovery obligations and that a requesting party was prejudiced as a result.132
Sanctions represent a manifestation of a court’s jurisdiction over a party.133
They discourage indifference to litigation holds or bad faith conduct during
discovery. Put another way, sanctions deter parties from acting adversely to a
court’s assertion of jurisdictional authority. Although sanctions function as a
deterrent, they should not discourage efforts to obtain discoverable information
130

See Allman, supra note 93, at 5–6.
See id. The safe harbor provision in the Federal Rules prohibits a court, absent “exceptional
circumstances,” from imposing sanctions on a party for discovery lost “as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
132 See Thomas C. Tew, Electronic Discovery Misconduct in Litigation: Letting the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 289, 297 n.36 (2007).
133 See Allman, supra note 93, at 6–7.
131
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from non-parties in litigation.134 Sanctions are not available against nonparties under the Federal Rules, but contempt of court serves an analogous
function.135 Thus, if and when a party serves a subpoena upon a non-party to
compel discovery, an enforcement mechanism ensures the non-party’s
compliance.136
C. Economic Benefits
Under the proposal this Comment suggests, shifting some of the burden of
discovery to non-parties might reduce litigation costs.137 Although this
approach adds a transaction cost to litigation by requiring that a party secure a
subpoena over a non-party, it should promote litigation efficiency in several
respects. First, it will encourage parties to limit their discovery requests. With
the added effort required to secure a subpoena over a non-party, a requesting
party might not do so if the discovery sought is only tangentially relevant to
the case.138 Second, because parties themselves would be obligated to produce
less than required by the current interpretation of Rule 45, they would have
less incentive to settle cases solely because of the cost of the discovery
process. As a result, parties would have less reason to initiate a meritless
claim.139 Ultimately, this should discourage frivolous litigation brought with
the anticipation that the opposing party is likely to settle to avoid discovery
costs.140 Finally, shifting discovery burdens to non-parties that maintain

134

See id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), 45(e).
136 See id. Additionally, a court could still hold a party accountable if it found the party to have failed to
take adequate measures to ensure the preservation of its own data at the hands of a non-party. See THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE
SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 31 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2004) (“Many organizations outsource all or
part of their information technology systems or share data with third parties for processing or other business
purposes. In contracting for such services, organizations should consider whether there is a provision for the
types of activities, such as preservation or collection of data that may be required by electronic
discovery . . . . This concern arises out of Fed. R. Civ. P 34, which allows discovery of documents in the
possession, custody or control of a party.”).
137 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 70
(1995).
138 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 598 (7th ed. 2007) (finding that the difference
in parties’ predictions of the outcome of a lawsuit “will depend on the cost of litigation relative to that of
settlement”).
139 See Kindall C. James, Comment, Electronic Discovery: Substantially Increasing the Risk of
Inadvertent Disclosure and the Costs of Privilege Review—Do the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Help? 52 LOY. L. REV. 839, 842 (2006).
140 See id.
135

COOPER GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

8/18/2010 10:45 AM

NON-PARTY ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

1361

electronic data encourages more efficient gathering and production of data.141
Because a non-party that maintains data presumably is better acquainted with
the data storage and retrieval systems than a party that simply has access to the
data, the non-party will be the least burdened producing it.
Justifying a non-party’s absorption of costs for litigation in which it has no
stake requires some explanation, however. Non-parties have a strong
argument that there is no reason they should be responsible for expenses
associated with litigation in which they have no stake. To justify imposing the
costs of discovery on a non-party with no stake in the outcome of litigation,
one must consider the non-party’s position relative to the parties to the
litigation. Cost shifting in electronic discovery disputes usually arises in the
context of commercial litigation.142 In such cases, a non-party possessing
discoverable information presumably has enjoyed a pecuniary interest in
maintaining an electronic network with one of the parties to the litigation.143
Accordingly, one would expect the non-party to be required to turn over the
electronic data to a court if a party with which the non-party interacts is
involved in litigation. This expectation is no different from what non-parties
might expect in litigation involving discovery of traditional media. In fact,
non-parties may actually avoid costs to the extent that a requesting party
chooses to limit its discovery requests to those parties with access to a nonparty’s ESI.144

141 Cf. John S. Wilson, Comment, Myspace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic
Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1213–14 (2007) (finding that shifting costs to requesting parties will
encourage more efficient storage of data for eventual production in litigation).
142 Jessica Lynn Repa, Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the
Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
257, 281 (2004).
143 Examples may include ISPs, intranet arrangements between corporate affiliates or subsidiaries, supplychain managers, or any other independent company, distinct from a party, that provides electronic database
services to the party. See generally, A Different Game, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 6–8 (discussing the
growth of the information technology industry). For three recent examples, consider first the non-party
software developer BayTSP that assisted Viacom in finding copyrighted material on YouTube in preparation
for an eventual copyright suit. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. C-08-80211 MISC.JF (PVT), 2009
WL 102808, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2009). Second, a suit between two software corporations involved a
non-party, R Systems, that had assisted the defendant in developing its software. Sedona Corp. v. Open
Solutions, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 19, 22 (D. Conn. 2008). Finally, in a suit involving Allstate Insurance Company,
discoverable information was held by a non-party, MS/B, that had assisted Allstate in developing its pricing
model for building or dwelling losses claimed by beneficiaries. Opperman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., Civil No.
07-1887 (RMB), 2008 WL 5071044, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2008).
144 Under this framework, a party need only seek discovery directly from a non-party when that discovery
is not related to a transaction or occurrence involved in the litigation. Otherwise, the requesting party may still
obtain the discovery from a party who has the ability to access it. As a result, requesting parties will be forced
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Further, non-parties might simply pass that cost along to their customers.
This is not traditional cost shifting where the non-party pays the costs of
discovery incurred by another entity. Rather, the non-party is the entity that
bears the burden of producing the discoverable data.145 While the costs of
litigation will never be allocated perfectly, this framework would ease the
burden on parties thereby reducing the tendency to settle litigation solely to
avoid discovery costs.
CONCLUSION
The continued application of the Federal Rules in cases involving nonparties’s ESI invites a host of legal and practical considerations. Courts and
the Federal Rules Advisory Committee must acknowledge the differences
between electronic data and traditional discovery media before issues
involving electronic discovery can be adjudicated effectively and efficiently.
Just as personal jurisdiction law underwent a radical change in response to
technological change and increased mobility, so should discovery law reflect
the unique dynamics and tremendous volume of electronic data.
Continuing the makeshift remedy that courts have created to address
discovery of data held by non-parties will only encourage inefficient discovery
at the expense of non-parties whose data are subject to discovery. Encouraging
non-party subpoenas or, in the alternative, narrowing the scope of discovery
for non-party data that is accessible to a party in litigation, will reduce the
undue burdens of electronic discovery while protecting the interests of nonparties. Such an approach will allocate costs more efficiently and uphold the
due process required for discovery in a digital age.
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to narrow their requests to parties and only seek discovery directly from non-parties when they expect that
discovery to be of great important to their case.
145 Unfortunately, under this arrangement the non-party will have to absorb some costs of litigation in
which it is not involved. However, a party and a non-party would be free to contract to have the party
indemnify the non-party for any costs incurred, such as for privilege review. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, 2009 WL
102808, at *5; see also SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP, supra note 136, at 31 (discussing the
possibility of such arrangements between parties and non-parties).
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